Bayesian and frequentist criteria are fundamentally different, but often posterior and sampling distributions are asymptotically equivalent (and normal). We compare Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis tests of inequality restrictions in such cases. For finite-dimensional parameters, if the null hypothesis is that the parameter vector lies in a certain half-space, then the Bayesian test has (frequentist) size α; if the null hypothesis is any other convex subspace, then the Bayesian test has size strictly above α; and if the null is non-convex, then the Bayesian test's size may be above or below α. For infinite-dimensional parameters, similar results hold. The example of first-order stochastic dominance testing is detailed.
Introduction
Although Bayesian and frequentist properties are fundamentally different, in many cases we can (approximately) achieve both. In other cases, the Bayesian and frequentist summaries of the data diverge greatly, and practitioners must carefully consider which to prefer. We provide results on the role of null hypothesis "shape" in determining such differences in order to alert practitioners to situations where difference may be large and to help understand why they are.
We consider cases where the sampling distribution of some estimator is asymptotically normal, while the asymptotic posterior is also normal, with the same covariance.
For simplicity, we consider the corresponding limit experiment, a single draw from a normal distribution with unknown mean and known covariance; an uninformative improper prior is used to capture the assumed asymptotic independence of the prior and posterior. We characterize the frequentist size of the Bayesian test that rejects when the null hypothesis has posterior probability below α. Under the loss function where this decision rule minimizes posterior expected loss, an unbiased frequentist test with size α is a minimax risk decision rule, so we compare the Bayesian test's size to α. This is also the most salient comparison in practice.
Under general conditions, we characterize the role of convexity of the null hypothesis, H 0 . More properly, we mean "convexity of the parameter subspace where H 0 is satisfied," but we use "convexity of H 0 " as shorthand throughout. If H 0 is a half-space (which is weakly convex), then Bayesian and frequentist tests agree: the Bayesian test has size α. Any other convex H 0 is sufficient but not necessary for frequentist testing to be strictly "more conservative": the Bayesian test's size is strictly above α. Equivalently, non-convexity of H 0 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the Bayesian test to be strictly more conservative, in the sense of having size strictly below α. An immediate corollary of these results is that Bayesian and frequentist tests agree asymptotically for testing a single linear inequality constraint, while frequentist testing is strictly more conservative for testing two or more linear inequality constraints (which always form a convex H 0 that is not a half-space). We provide a similar result on the role of convexity for tests of infinite-dimensional pa-rameters. Despite the equivalence of sampling and posterior distributions and the equivalence of the usual normality-based confidence and credible sets for the parameter of interest, the Bayesian and frequentist interpretations of the evidence for H 0 can differ greatly.
Generally, neither test dominates the other in a decision-theoretic sense: often one rejection region is a strict subset of another, so one test has higher type I error rates while the other has higher type II error rates. Our results concern practical differences in conclusions about H 0 rather than admissibility.
First-order stochastic dominance (SD1) testing is an important example where the Bayesian/frequentist difference can be big. We illustrate this through simulations with both continuous and discrete distributions, and we compare having a null of dominance to a null of non-dominance.
Some recent papers have focused on settings where frequentist inference is "too conservative" from a Bayesian perspective. For testing linear inequality constraints of the form H 0 : θ ≥ 0 with θ ∈ R d , Kline (2011) finds frequentist testing to be more conservative (e.g., his Figure 1 ), especially as the dimension d grows; this agrees with our general result since these are strictly convex H 0 . As another example, frequentist inference on the true parameter 1 is more conservative under set identification: asymptotically, the frequentist confidence sets for the true parameter (Imbens and Manski, 2004; Stoye, 2009) are strictly larger than the estimated identified set rather than strictly smaller like the Bayesian credible sets, as shown by Moon and Schorfheide (2012, Cor. 1) . 2 Our setup is not directly comparable to theirs since a Bayesian credible set cannot be inverted into a test (as the frequentist framework permits).
Earlier in the literature, the focus was on frequentist tests of two-sided hypotheses rejecting too often from a Bayesian perspective. In these cases, the prior has a point mass on the single value in H 0 , so it may not disappear asymptotically (as we assume).
For example, in Lindley's (1957) famous paradox, the frequentist test rejects while the Bayesian test does not. Casella and Berger (1987) compare Bayesian and frequentist one-sided testing of a location parameter, given a single draw of X from an otherwise fully known density.
They compare the p-value, p(x), to the infimum of the posterior P (H 0 | x) over various classes of priors. In many cases, the infimum is attained by the improper prior of Lebesgue measure on (−∞, ∞) and equals p(x) (p. 109). Their results are more general than ours since the density need not be normal and the priors can be informative, but they are more restrictive in having only a scalar parameter and only one inequality tested.
Section 2 describes the Bayesian test and some decision-theoretic context. Sections 3 and 4 compare Bayesian and frequentist tests of finite-dimensional and infinitedimensional parameters, respectively. Section 5 illustrates the results through SD1
testing. Proofs are collected in Appendix A. Acronyms used include posterior expected loss (PEL), rejection probability (RP), and first-order stochastic dominance (SD1). Notationally, Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF with quantiles z α ≡ Φ −1 (α), ⊆ means subset, and ⊂ means proper subset; scalars, column vectors, and matrices are respectively formatted as lowercase x, x, and x for fixed values or uppercase X, X, and X for random; 0(·) denotes the zero function, 0(t) = 0 for all t.
Bayesian test and decision-theoretic context
The Bayesian test examined in this paper is a generalized Bayes decision rule that minimizes posterior expected loss (PEL) for the loss function taking value 1 − α for type I error, α for type II error, and zero otherwise. Let P(· | x) denote the posterior probability given observed data X = x. The PEL for the decision to reject H 0 is
(1 − α) P(H 0 | x), i.e., the loss corresponding to a type I error times the posterior probability of H 0 being true (which implies a type I error if the decision is to reject).
Similarly, the PEL of accepting
. PEL is thus minimized by rejecting H 0 if P(H 0 | x) ≤ α and accepting H 0 otherwise. This is implicitly the same Bayesian test considered by Casella and Berger (1987) , although they compare P(H 0 | x) to a frequentist p-value rather than discuss "testing" explicitly. 
where P θ (·) is the probability under θ. Having size α means sup θ∈Θ 0 P θ (reject) = α.
Unbiasedness means sup θ∈Θ 0 P θ (reject) ≤ inf θ∈Θ 1 P θ (reject); by continuity (in θ) of the power function, inf θ∈Θ 1 P θ (reject) = α, so the maximum risk in (1) is α(1 − α).
Increasing the nominal level above α increases the first term inside the max in (1) above α(1 − α), and decreasing the level below α increases the second term above Absent an unbiased test, the minimax-risk-optimal size of a test is above α, but the magnitude of the difference is very small for conventional α. Consider a particular type of test and varying the size of the test, γ 0 = sup θ∈Θ 0 P θ (reject). As a function of
In the extreme, γ 1 (γ 0 ) = 0 for all γ 0 , and the maximum risk is α for any test with
is strictly increasing in γ 0 but γ 1 (α) < α, then minimax risk is achieved at some γ 0 ∈ (α, α/(1 − α)). For example, rounding to two significant digits, if α = 0.05, then γ 0 ∈ (0.050, 0.053), or if α = 0.1, then γ 0 ∈ (0.10, 0.11).
Ideally, a single decision rule minimizes both the maximum risk in (1) and PEL.
However, if the Bayesian test's size is significantly above or below α, this is not possible. In such cases, it may help to use both Bayesian and frequentist inference and to carefully consider the differences in optimality criteria.
Finite-dimensional parameters
We first discuss testing in one dimension for intuition in Section 3.1 and then provide general results in Section 3.2.
One-dimensional parameter
Let θ ∈ R be the parameter of interest. Consider a Gaussian shift experiment where the sampling and posterior distributions are, respectively,
where the sampling distribution treats X as random and θ as fixed, while the posterior treats θ as random and the observed value x as fixed. This can be interpreted as a limit experiment where θ is a local mean parameter. For example, if
This type of result holds for a wide variety of models, estimators, and sampling assumptions; it is most commonly used for local power analysis but has also been used for purposes like ours in papers like Andrews and Soares (2010, eqn. (4.2)). Since θ is the local mean parameter, assuming θ ∈ R does not require that the original parameter space (e.g., for µ n in the example) is R, but it does exclude boundary points.
In (2) we presume that the prior has no asymptotic effect on the posterior (as in the Bernstein-von Mises theorem). This is equivalent to taking an improper uninformative prior in the limit experiment. For example, with prior θ ∼ N (m, τ 2 ), the posterior is
and taking τ 2 → ∞ yields the posterior in (2).
Let α be as in Method 1, so the Bayesian test rejects if and only if P(H 0 ) ≤ α.
then the Bayesian test rejects if and only if
x ≥ c 0 + z 1−α :
Its size is exact:
By symmetry, with Θ 0 = [c 0 , ∞), the Bayesian test also has size α.
Consider the strict subset Θ 0 ⊂ (−∞, c 0 ]. Since the posterior in (2) has support on all of R, using (3),
so (by continuity) the Bayesian test now rejects for some x < c 0 + z 1−α , in addition to all x ≥ c 0 + z 1−α . That is, letting the rejection region for H 0 : θ ≤ c 0 be R 1 = {x :
x ≥ c 0 + z 1−α } and letting the rejection region for H 0 : θ ∈ Θ 0 be R 2 , the latter is strictly larger: R 1 ⊂ R 2 . Thus, size is strictly above α: using (4),
The removal of values from Θ 0 decreases the posterior probability of θ ∈ Θ 0 , but it does not change the sampling distribution given any particular θ ∈ Θ 0 (like θ = c 0 ).
Taken to the extreme, let Θ 0 = [a, c 0 ] with (c 0 − a)/2 ≤ z 0.5+α/2 , i.e., a very short interval. Then, the Bayesian test always rejects. The posterior probability of H 0 is maximized when X falls in the exact middle of Θ 0 , and given
The Bayesian test's size is then 1: it has 100% type I error rate for any θ ∈ [a, c 0 ].
Conversely, by Bayesian standards, any frequentist test is (much) too conservative.
One example of a non-convex Θ 0 is generated by the nonlinear inequality constraint test of 
The size of the Bayesian test is, using (7),
As h → ∞, size approaches α. If h < z 1−α/2 , then the Bayesian test never rejects:
Opposite the case of convex Θ 0 , any frequentist test rejects too often as judged by posterior expected loss, while the Bayesian test has up to 100% type II error rate.
However, there are also non-convex H 0 for which the Bayesian test's size is strictly above α. Consider H 0 : θ ∈ {0, ǫ}, a set of two points. The Bayesian test always rejects since
given any x, so its size is 1.
Theorem 1 summarizes the one-dimensional results.
Theorem 1. Let θ ∈ R and Θ 0 ⊂ R. Consider (2) and the Bayesian test in Method 1 
General finite-dimensional parameter
Now let θ ∈ R k . Similar to (2), the sampling and posterior distributions are (ii) For any non-half-space, closed For the special case of H 0 : θ ≥ 0 (elementwise) against H 1 : θ ≥ 0 (i.e., at least one element θ j < 0), with θ ∈ R k , Kline (2011, p. 3136) explains the possible divergence of Bayesian and frequentist conclusions when the dimensionality k grows.
He gives the example of observing x = 0, where for large k the Bayesian P(H 0 | x = 0) ≈ 0 while the frequentist p-value is near one. Inverting his example, if instead H 0 : θ ≥ 0 and H 1 : θ ≥ 0, then the divergence is in the opposite direction:
P(H 0 | x = 0) ≈ 1 can occur even when the p-value is near zero.
Infinite-dimensional parameters
For infinite-dimensional parameters, we show that the finite-dimensional results can extend in the expected way (under certain conditions). Instead of θ ∈ R k , let θ(·) be the unknown local mean function of interest. Analogous to (10), the sampling and posterior distributions are
where G is a Gaussian process and Σ(·, ·) is the known, positive definite covariance function.
First, consider the example H 0 : θ(·) ≤ 0(·) (i.e., θ(j) ≤ 0 for all j), or H 0 :
This applies to testing first-order stochastic dominance (SD1) for continuous distributions:
. By first transforming the data by F 0 (·), we can equivalently test SD1 against the Unif(0, 1) distribution, and the processes in (11) are standard Brownian bridges shifted to have non-zero mean, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]; i.e., Σ(s, t) = min{s, t} − st.
For any single j, X(j) is normal, specifically X(j) ∼ N (θ(j), Σ(j, j)); the posterior is also normal, θ(j) ∼ N (x(j), Σ(j, j)), and Σ(j, j) > 0. Thus, by Theorem 1, the Bayesian test of H 0 : θ(j) ≤ 0 has size α. For any θ(·) on the boundary of Θ 0 , there exists (at least one) j such that θ(j) = 0. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, let
has a strictly larger rejection region than that of θ(·) ∈ Θ 0,b , so when θ(j) = 0 it has rejection probability strictly above α. This is particularly apparent when θ(·) = 0(·) and the Bayesian rejection region is strictly (and much) larger than that for the test rejecting if x(j) > z 1−α Σ(j, j) for a particular j. In fact, even if x(·) = 0(·), the posterior P(H 0 | x(·) = 0(·)) = 0 (e.g., Smirnov, 1939, Thm. 2) . This example of SD1 is illustrated further in Section 5.
More generally, we have the following results. The main complication is that the function space in which θ(·) lives determines the space of bounded linear functionals of θ(·) (i.e., the dual space), whereas for finite-dimensional θ ∈ R k the bounded linear functionals are just c ′ θ for c ∈ R k . Otherwise, the results (and proofs) largely parallel the finite-dimensional case. 
Theorem 4. Let the (local) parameter of interest be θ(·) ∈ Θ = C(T ), the (real) continuous functions on compact semimetric space T = (J , d(·, ·)) with interval
J = [a, b] ⊆R and semimetric d : J × J → R ≥0 . Let f (·) ∈ C(T ) * ,: θ(·) ∈ Θ 0 against H 1 : θ(·) ∈ Θ 0 . (i) Let Θ 0 = {t(·) : f (t(·)) ≤ c 0 } for constant c 0 ∈ R (i.
e., a half-space), and assume f (X(·)) has finite variance. Then, the Bayesian test of H
has size α; the type I error rate is exactly α for any θ(·) such that f (θ(·)) = c 0 .
(ii) For any closed 4 Θ 0 not of the form in (i), let θ b (·) denote a support point (e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006, p. 252 Regarding the assumptions, it is common to have a (frequentist) Gaussian process limit with sample paths continuous with respect to the covariance semimetric; see, e.g., van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) . For the earlier example of SD1, we implicitly considered the functional f (t(·)) = t(j 0 ), which can be written J t(j) dρ(j) where the measure ρ(·) has unit mass on j 0 (and is zero elsewhere), and
was the half-space containing Θ 0 .
A natural question is whether the sampling and posterior distributions are ever equivalent in the sense of (11). Although the answer is "no" more often than in finite dimensions (e.g., Freedman, 1999) , the answer is still often "yes." Consider the example of inference on a continuous univariate CDF, given iid sampling. On the frequentist side,
an F -Brownian bridge (where B(·) is a standard Brownian bridge), with denoting weak convergence in ℓ ∞ (R); see for example van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, Ex.
2.1.3). For weak convergence under sequences F n (·) → F (·), see van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, §2.8.3) . For a nonparametric Bayesian method using the Dirichlet process of Ferguson (1973) , Lo (1983, Thm. 2.1) shows that a centered (atF (·)) and √ n-scaled version of the posterior converges to an F -Brownian bridge if the prior dominates F (·).
Even with an improper prior, i.e., using the Bayesian bootstrap of Rubin (1981 ), Lo (1987 shows that the centered and scaled posterior converges as in (12).
For our purpose of approximating the finite-sample difference between Bayesian and frequentist testing, considering a fixed DGP and drifting centering parameter can be just as helpful as considering a fixed centering parameter and drifting DGP. In the finite-dimensional case, the limit experiment in (10) can come from
so X is a test statistic based on the observed (computed)μ and centered at µ 0,n . This does not have a literal meaning like "we must change µ 0 if our sample size increases," just as a drifting DGP does not mean literally that "the population distribution changes as we collect more data"; rather, it is simply a way to capture the idea of µ 0 being "close to" the true µ in the asymptotics. For the posterior, letting
For the infinite-dimensional case, a similar setup to (13) is, for general rate of convergence n r (e.g., r = 1/2),
For the posterior, with θ(·) = n r (µ(·) − µ 0,n (·)) and
5 Example: first-order stochastic dominance
We illustrate the foregoing results through the case of testing first-order stochastic dominance (SD1). We assume iid sampling throughout.
For geometric intuition, consider a discrete distribution with known, finite support {x 1 , . . . , x k }. Let the unknown probabilities be p j ≡ P(X = x j ), where
by assumption. LetF = F (x 1 ), . . . ,F (x k−1 ) , F = (F (x 1 ) , . . . , F (x k−1 )), and
For a Bayesian model with a Dirichlet prior, similarly, the Dirichlet posterior converges to a multivariate normal distribution; see, e.g., Goldman and Kaplan (2015, Lemma 7(ii) ).
, for example, then q ∈ R 2 , and H 0 is the third quadrant, which is convex (and not a half-space). If k = 4, then H 0 is the negative orthant, which near the origin is even "more" convex in the sense that the orthant is only 1/8 of any ball centered at the origin, whereas a quadrant is 1/4. For general k, within any hypercube centered at the origin, H 0 takes up 1/2 k−1 of the volume; in this sense, H 0 becomes "more convex" as k grows, in which case we expect greater Bayesian/frequentist differences.
Instead, SD1 may be the alternative hypothesis, so that H 0 is non-dominance.
That is, H 0 is that q j > 0 for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, while H 1 : q ≤ 0.
For our simulations, we consider SD1 with continuous distributions. The intuition is similar to having a discrete distribution with a large number of support points.
Given fixed distribution F 0 (·), the question is whether the true distribution F (·) SD1
F 0 (·), i.e., F (t)−F 0 (t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ R. Goldman and Kaplan (2016) construct a uniform confidence band for F (·) that has exact frequentist coverage probability in finite samples and, for a continuity-corrected Bayesian bootstrap from Banks (1988), identical Bayesian posterior probability ("credibility"). However, the highly (non-)convex shape of H 0 for (non-)SD1 causes frequentist and Bayesian testing to diverge.
We also consider two-sample SD1 inference, replacing the fixed F 0 (·) with unknown
In Table 1 , we compare frequentist p-values with the Bayesian posterior probability of H 0 in a particular dataset. For testing the null of SD1, the results are qualitatively the same as in the one-sample finite-dimensional example in Kline (2011, §4) . For different h, we set X i = i/(n + 1) + hn −1/2 for i = 1, . . . , n. This sample is compared with either the standard uniform CDF or a second sample with Y i = i/n for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 (to prevent ties where some X i = Y k exactly). When the null is SD1, i.e., testing H 0 :
, we use the KS p-values from ks.test in R (R Core Team, 2013) . When the null is non-SD1, i.e., testing
, we use the two-sample p-value from Davidson and Duclos (2013) and a one-sample p-value from an intersection-union test based on Goldman and Kaplan (2016) . For the Bayesian posterior probabilities, the Bayesian bootstrap variant of Banks (1988) is used. The results in Table 1 illustrate the importance of the shape of H 0 in determining differences between Bayesian and frequentist inference, consistent with our general theoretical findings. When the null is SD1, the subspace of distribution functions satisfying H 0 is (very) convex near the "corner" F 0 (·). Consequently, whenF X (·) ≈ F 0 (·), or whenF X (·) ≈F Y (·), the Bayesian posterior has essentially zero probability in H 0 . Asymptotically, this is represented by the probability that a standard Brownian bridge is everywhere positive, which is zero; Table 1 shows zero up to a few decimal places already at n = 1000. In stark contrast, the frequentist p-value is near one when the estimatedF X (·) satisfies the null. When the null is non-SD1, H 0 and H 1 switch places, so now H 0 is highly non-convex. The frequentist test is more skeptical about H 0 than the Bayesian test, for both one-sample and two-sample inference:
the frequentist p-values are always significantly lower than the Bayesian posterior probabilities of H 0 across a range of h. For two-sample, non-SD1 testing, we also tried an intersection-union max-t test similar to Kaur, Prakasa Rao, and Singh (1994) In Table 2 , we compare rejection probabilities of the Bayesian and frequentist
for i = 1, . . . , n (for two-sample inference), and F 0 (·) is the Unif(0, 1) CDF. The hypotheses, methods, and notation are the same as for Table 1 . The qualitative patterns are the same as in Table 1 . With the convex H 0 of SD1, when h = 0, the Bayesian type I error rate is nearly 100%, whereas the frequentist tests control size at α = 0.1. With the non-convex H 0 of non-SD1, although no tests reject when h = 0, the frequentist tests have much steeper power curves as h is increased. Although less powerful than the test of Davidson and Duclos (2013) , the intersection-union ttest (not shown in table) still has better power than the Bayesian test, with rejection probabilities 0.089 and 0.294 with n = 100 and h ∈ {0.9, 1.3} (respectively), and 0.084 and 0.294 (again) with n = 1000 and h ∈ {0.9, 1.3} (respectively). As in Table 1 , the differences do not diminish with larger n.
Conclusion
We have explored the difference between Bayesian and frequentist testing of general nonlinear inequality constraints, providing formal results on the role of convexity of the null hypothesis parameter subspace. Testing first-order stochastic dominance is an example where no test can achieve both Bayesian and frequentist optimality; depending whether the null hypothesis is dominance or non-dominance, either Bayesian or frequentist tests may have higher rejection probability. With this motivation, we have separate work in progress to detail Bayesian inference for first-order and higher-order stochastic dominance. Investigation of approaches like Müller and Norets (2016) applied to nonlinear inequality testing and extension of our results to cases without asymptotic normality remain for future work.
satisfied. The hypothesis H
states that the Bayesian test of this H 0 has size α. Moreover, exact α type I error rate is attained for any θ on the boundary of Θ 0 , i.e., any θ such that c ′ θ = c 0 . 
for any x, so R 0,b ⊂ R 0 . Since the sampling distribution of X given θ b is also normal with support R k , P θ b (X ∈ R 0 ) > P θ b (X ∈ R 0,b ) = α: the Bayesian test of H 0 : θ ∈ Θ 0 has type I error rate strictly above α given θ = θ b , so it also has size strictly above α.
By the supporting hyperplane theorem, if Θ 0 is convex, then every boundary point has a supporting hyperplane, so the above argument applies to every boundary point θ b ; since Θ 0 is closed, all its boundary points satisfy H 0 . (If Θ 0 is not closed, the same qualitative result holds by continuity, but it must be articulated as the limiting type I error rate along a sequence in Θ 0 whose limit point is on the boundary of, and thus outside, Θ 0 .)
Part (iii)
We provide two examples to show that the Bayesian test's size may be either above or below α with non-convex Θ 0 . If Θ 0 = R k \{0}, so H 0 : θ = 0 and H 1 : θ = 0, then Θ 0 is non-convex. Since P(θ = 0 | X = x) = 0 for any x since the posterior is normal, P(H 1 | x) = 0 and P(H 0 | x) = 1 for all x, so the Bayesian test never rejects (irrespective of θ) and has size equal to zero.
If Θ 0 consists of any two points, then it is not convex. Again, since the posterior is normal, the probability of any finite number of points is zero, so P(H 0 | x) = 0 for any x, and the Bayesian test always rejects (irrespective of θ), for any α. Thus, its size equals one.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3
The single linear inequality case is given explicitly in Theorem 2. With multiple non-redundant linear inequalities, Θ 0 cannot be a half-space, otherwise all but one of the inequalities must be redundant (since any half-space can be expressed as a single linear inequality). The intersection of any number of convex sets is convex, so Θ 0 is convex because it is the intersection of all the half-spaces (which are convex) corresponding to each linear inequality constraint. Thus, the result from Theorem 2 for non-half-space convex Θ 0 applies.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Part (i) If X(·) is a Gaussian process in some Banach space and f (·) belongs to the dual of the space, then f (X(·)) is Gaussian in R; see, e.g., Definition 2.2.1(ii)
in Bogachev (1998, p. 42) . (The result that c ′ X is Gaussian in R when c and X take values in Euclidean space R k is a special case of this: being a Hilbert space, Euclidean space is self-dual and thus the dual space is inner products with elements of R k , f (X) = c ′ X.)
We may decompose G(θ(·), Σ(·, ·)) = θ(·) + G(0(·), Σ(·, ·)), the non-random mean function plus a zero-mean Gaussian process with known covariance. Since f (·) is linear (by definition), f (G(θ(·), Σ(·, ·))) = f (θ(·)) + f (G(0(·), Σ(·, ·))).
Since Σ(·, ·) is known, the second term in (17) has a known mean-zero scalar Gaussian distribution. Since f (·) is from the dual of the space where θ(·) resides, f (θ(·)) ∈ R (but is unknown). Thus, by applying f (·), the problem reduces to the scalar case where X ∼ N(µ, σ 2 ) with known σ 2 and unknown µ, and applying Theorem 1 gives the stated result. By part (i), the type I error rate of the Bayesian test of H 0 : θ(·) ∈ Θ 0,b is exactly α when θ(·) = θ b (·). Since Θ 0 ⊂ Θ 0,b , the Bayesian test of H 0 : θ(·) ∈ Θ 0 has a strictly larger rejection region and thus strictly larger rejection probability, so its type I error rate given θ(·) = θ b (·) is strictly above α, and thus its size is also strictly above α.
If Θ 0 is closed and convex, and if additionally it has a non-empty interior, then Theorem 5.67 (a geometric form of the Hahn-Banach theorem) in Aliprantis and Border (2006, p. 202 ) can be applied with A and B in their notation corresponding respectively to Θ 0 and a singleton set with any boundary point, {θ b (·)}, with the conclusion that θ b (·) is a support point. (For closed convex sets with nonempty interior, the result that every boundary point is a support point is well-known and often stated without citation or justification, e.g., as in Phelps (1987, p. 319) .) If instead the interior of Θ 0 is empty, then the Gaussian process posterior probability P(θ(·) ∈ Θ 0 | x(·)) = 0,
